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The Implications of UNCLOS for Canada's
Regulatory Jurisdiction in the Offshorethe 200-Mile Limit and the Continental
Shelf

The author examines the current state of international law governing Canada's
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the exploitation of hydrocarbons within its
continental shelf. These rights are reviewed from a historical perspective through
the progression of international conventions, the decisions of international tribunals
and the enactment of Canadian federal laws. The article includes an examination of
Canada's rights under international law respecting its 200-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf beyond, as well as a review of Canada's
maritime boundary disputes with adjacent coastal states.

L'auteur se penche sur I'6tat actuel du droit international applicable 6 la
souverainet6 du Canada etJ sa competence sur I'exploitation des hydrocarbures
de son plateau continental. Ces droits sont examines dans un contexte historique,
. la lumi~re d'une succession de conventions internationales, des arr6ts de
tribunaux internationaux et de la promulgation de lois fed6rales canadiennes.
Cet article comporte en outre un examen des droits du Canada, en vertu du
droit international, sur la zone 6conomique exclusive de 200 milles marins et le
plateau continental qui s'6tend au-del de cette limite; rauteur6tudie 6galement
les differends concernant les frontieres entre le Canada et les Etats c6tiers
adjacents.
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Introduction
Canada regulates oil and gas development in the Atlantic offshore area and
Beaufort Sea under an extensive body of statutes, regulations, and policies.
From an international law perspective, Canada's authority to exercise
such jurisdiction is dependent upon having a recognized sovereign right
to regulate development activities beyond its territorial sea, within the
boundaries of the continental shelf that appertains to it, and not that of an
adjacent coastal nation.
The current regime of international law affecting the nature and extent
of Canada's sovereignty in its offshore region is relatively new, having
emerged and developed largely since the end of the Second World War.
The most significant and comprehensive development in international
law regarding offshore sovereignty was the adoption of the 1982 United
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), I to which Canada
is a signatory. The Convention entered into force in November 1994 and
was.ratified by Canada in November 2003.
The period following the end of the Second World War until the
adoption of the UNCLOS saw the issuance of proclamations and
declarations by coastal states throughout the world asserting varying and
overlapping claims concerning the limits of territorial seas and fishing
zones and sovereignty over the continental shelf for the purpose of
2
conserving and exploiting its natural resources.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the existing regime under
international law that establishes and defines the respective rights of
coastal states, such as Canada, over their maritime areas for the purpose
of exploring and exploiting the hydrocarbon resources located within the
seabed and subsoil. In providing context for the current rules, this paper
reviews the historical emergence and evolution of the continental shelf
regime through developments in international law and the assertion by
Canada of extended maritime claims through policy, federal legislation,
and executive orders. The concepts and principles of international law
governing Canada's sovereignty and jurisdiction in the offshore are not
specific to any particular coast-Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic. For the most
part, they have general application to all three coastal regions.
Canada shares maritime boundaries with three countries: the United
States, France (involving St. Pierre and Miquelon), and Denmark (involving
Greenland). Some of Canada's continental shelf boundaries have been
determined with these countries either by agreement or dispute resolution
procedures while some remain unresolved. 3 This paper examines and
discusses the issues and circumstances surrounding some of the boundary
disputes and how, in some cases, boundary delimitation has been settled
or determined. In addition, it explores the procedures established by and
made available under the UNCLOS to resolve maritime boundary disputes.
1.
10 December 1982, U.N. Doe A/CONF 62/122 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
2.
UN, UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea (ahistoricalperspective), Oceans and Law of
the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, online: <http-/Avww.unorg/Depts/osconvenion_
agreements/conventionhistoficaljerspective.hbn> [UNCLOSHistoricalPerspective].
3.
A number of continental shelf boundaries remain undetermined between Canada and the United
States. Regarding the Beaufort Sea, see Walter B. Parker & John Harlow Byrne, "Sea Changes:
Perspectives on Alaska's Future Under the Pending United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea and the Findings of the United States Oceans Commission Report" (Dec. 2004) Prepared for the
Alaska State Legislature by the Institute of the North, online: <http://www.institutenorth.org/servlet/
content/reports.html>; in the west, there are disagreements over the boundaries in the Dixon Entrance
and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, both of which are discussed in detail at Tony Fogarassy, The Alaskan
Boundary Dispute: History and InternationalLaw, online: Clark Wilson LLP <http://www.cwilson.
com/pubs/energy/alaska.pdf>.
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The issue of cooperative arrangements for the development of hydrocarbon
resources that underlie both sides of a delimited boundary are discussed
with reference to Canadian examples and the potential implications to the
structure of regulatory regimes.
This paper begins by examining the nature of international law as
context to discuss the effect of the UNCLOS. Part Ii reviews the historical
development of the current continental shelf regime in international law.
Part III traces the steps which ultimately resulted in the UNCLOS, surveys
its content, and discusses the response of various States. Parts IV and V
describe Canadian claims to continental shelf rights and boundary disputes
with adjacent coastal States. Part VI outlines the factors used to determine
boundary delimitation and Part VII describes the mechanisms contained
in the UNCLOS for dispute resolution. Part VIII addresses issues related
to transboundary development.
I. The nature of internationallaw
International law has been described as
the body of rules which are legally binding on states in their intercourse
with each other. These rules are primarily those which govern the relations
of states, but states are not the only subjects of international law.
That part of international law that is binding on all states, as is far the
greater part of customary laws, may be called universal international law,
in contradistinction to particularinternational law, which is binding on
two or a few states only. Generalinternational law is that which is binding
upon a great many states. General international law, such as provisions of
certain treaties which are widely, but not universally, binding and which
application, has a tendency to
establishes rules appropriate for universal
4
become universal international law.

"Sources" of international law are outlined in Article 38 of the Statute of
the InternationalCourt ofJustice5 (ICJ) as comprising:
1. (a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
(b)

international customs as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;

(c) the principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4.
Sir Robert Jennings & SirArthur Watts, Oppenheim s nternationalLaw, 91 ed. (Essex, England:
Longman Group UK, 1992) at 4 [Oppenheims InternationalLaw].
5.
Charterof the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No.7, Annex.
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(subject to the provisions of Article 59) judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.

The statute notes that:
2.

This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a
case ex aequo et bono,6 if the parties agree thereto.

Of the four sources, this article will summarily discuss customs and
treaties or conventions, having regard to the comprehensive and detailed
examination of these subject matters in Oppenheim s InternationalLaw.7
International law can be derived from custom, which is "the oldest and the
original source of international law as well as of law in general." 8 Custom
involves two elements-a settled practice that certain actions are carried
out in a particular way, and under a belief that conducting the actions in
such a manner is obligatory or right. Custom is distinct from mere usage
in that the actions that give rise to a usage are not based on the belief of
obligation. 9 International treaties are the "second source of international
law." Treaties may be more correctly viewed as a formal source of rules
(rights and obligations) between states rather than of law, "which is usually
taken to require a generality and automaticity of application which treaties
do not typically possess."'" Treaties are based "on the customary rule of
international law that treaties are binding upon the contracting parties."'
II. Emergence of the continentalshelf regime in internationallaw
1. The rise of continentalshelf claims
Prior to the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shell' 2 in
1958, there had been no formal recognition under international law of a
coastal state's sovereign rights over its continental shelf for any purpose,
including the exploration and exploitation of natural resources beyond
the territorial sea. In Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf

6.
To decide a case ex aequo et bono means that "the decision will not be based on the application
of legal rules but on the basis of such other considerations as the court may in all the circumstances
regard as right and proper." See Oppenheim s InternationalLaw, supranote 4 at 44 and n. 6.
7.
Supra note 4.
8.
Ibid.at 25.
9.
Ibid. at 25-29.
10. Ibid. at 31.
II. Ibid.

12. 29 April 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/2 at 624 (entered into force on 10
June 1966).
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Offshore Newfoundland,3 the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that
international law concerning the continental shelf is a relatively recent
development.
The Convention on the ContinentalShelf arose out of the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, initiated in February 1958.14
This Convention entered into force in 1964 following the required number
of State ratifications. Canada was a party to the treaty which it ratified
in 1970. There were three other conventions adopted from the 1958
Conference-the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone,'5 the Convention on the High Seas,16 and the Convention on Fishing
and Conservationof the Living Resources of the High Seas. I7
Until the adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the
concept of sovereign continental shelf rights had only been a claim
asserted under numerous and diverse proclamations regarding resource
and fishery zones ranging in distance up to 200 nautical miles, and had not
been recognized as an international custom accepted as law.I8 The principal
need for a.recognized international law convention respecting jurisdiction
over the continental shelf arose due to the post-war development of
technology capable of exploring offshore resources and in the face of
the ever-increasing and conflicting claims among adjacent coastal states
regarding their authority over resource development in the area of the
continental shelf.
One of the initial developments in the emergence of international
law involving continental shelf rights was a treaty between Venezuela
and the United Kingdom, on behalf of its then-colonies Trinidad and
Tobago.' 9 It was the first international accord regarding the division of the
continental shelf and it followed Venezuela's annexation of certain parts
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 [HiberniaReference Case].At para. 72 the Court stated the following:
We conclude that international law had not sufficiently developed by 1949 to confer,
ipsojure, the right of the coastal State to explore and exploit the continental shelf. We
think that in 1949 State practice was neither sufficiently widespread to constitute a general
practice nor sufficiently consistent to constitute settled law. Furthermore, several of the
early State claims exceeded that which international law subsequently recognized in the
1958 Geneva Convention. International law on the continental shelf developed rather
quickly, but it had not attained concrete form by 1949.
14. There have been three United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea; the first in 1958, the
second in 1960 which was unsuccessful, and the third that led to the 1982 UnitedNations Convention
on the Law of the Sea.
15. 29 April 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force on 10 September 1964).
16. 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. II and 82 (entered into force on 30 September 1962).
17. 29 April 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force on 20 March 1966).
18. UNCLOS HistoricalPerspective,supranote 2.
19. Treaty Relating to the SubmarineAreas of the Gulfof Paria,Venezuela and United Kingdom, 26
February 1942, 205 UNTS 121-27.
13.
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of the submarine area of the Gulf of Paria. This bilateral agreement went
beyond merely asserting sovereign rights over continental shelf resources.
It asserted that the United Kingdom's area of the divided Gulf became the
territory of Trinidad and Tobago.
The emergence of the current continental shelf regime was set in
motion following President Truman's September 1945 proclamation
on the continental shelf.20 One of the preamble clauses to the Truman
Proclamation articulated the foundation for the claim as advanced by the
United States:
Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United States that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf of the contiguous nation is reasonable
and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilise or conserve these
resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from
shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the
land mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it, since
these resources frequently form a seaward extension of a pool or deposit
lying within the territory, and since self-protection compels the coastal
nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of their
nature necessary for utilisation of these resources;"'
The Proclamation decreed that the:
...
United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed
of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts
of the United States as appertaining
to the United States, subject to its
2
jurisdiction and control.1
The doctrine articulated by the Truman Proclamation was extremely
significant in several respects: (1) it recognized the continental shelf as an
extension of the land mass thus being appurtenant to it; (2) the exercise
of jurisdiction over the continental shelf would be for the utilization,
conservation and protection of resources; (3) the boundary ofthe continental
shelf shared with an adjacent state would be determined by the two parties
in accordance with equitable principles; and (4) the exercise ofjurisdiction
over the continental shelf would not affect free and unimpeded navigation
in the high seas of the waters above the continental shelf.

20. U.S., Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf 28 September 1945 [Truman
Proclamation].
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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After making the Gulf of Paria treaty with Venezuela, the United
Kingdom moved to extend further territorial boundaries to include the
continental shelf of some of its other colonies-the Bahamas and Jamaica
in 1948, British Honduras in 1950, and the Falkland Islands in 1952.23
However, the United Kingdom's claim that the continental shelf was within
its territory was not ultimately accepted as part of the continental shelf
regime established under international law pursuant to the Convention on
the ContinentalShelf
Following the Truman Proclamation, more claims were advanced
by other coastal states to extend their territorial authority to include the
continental shelf. In 1946 Argentina claimed its continental shelf and the
epicontinental sea above it. In 1947, Chile and Peru claimed sovereign
rights over a 200-nautical-mile area. Ecuador followed in 1950. This was
an attempt by these countries to limit the access of distant-water fishing
24
fleets and to control the depletion of fish stocks in their adjacent seas.
In 1953, the United States enacted the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands
Act.25 Section 1332(1) of that Act provided:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and
sea-bed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as
provided in this subchapter.
Section 1331 (a) defines "outer Continental Shelf' to mean:
...
all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and
of which the subsoil and sea-bed appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction and control;
All of these events underscored the need to develop uniform and
internationally accepted rules and principles to govern the rights of coastal
states over the continental shelf.

23. See HiberniaReference Case, supra note 13 at para. 16.
24. Supranote 2.
25. 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356(1953).
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2. Effect of the Convention on the Continental Shelf
Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on the ContinentalShelf 6 codified the
concept and widely adopted practice of coastal States exercising sovereign
rights over the exploitation of natural resources within the area of their
respective continental shelves. Article 6 of the Convention mandates that
disputes shall be determined by agreement, which is in accordance with
one of the fundamental tenets of customary international law. Adjacent or
opposite coastal States were required to settle continental shelf boundary
disputes by agreement. Failing agreement, boundaries were to be determined
using the principle of equidistance, absent special circumstances.
In the North Sea ContinentalShelfCases(FederalRepublic ofGermany
v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands),27 the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed the view that the continental
shelf rights enshrined in the Convention on the Continental Shelf were
a reflection of the doctrine articulated in the Truman Proclamation. The
Court considered the Truman Proclamation to have special significance as

being the starting point of the positive law on the rights of states regarding
the continental shelf. It observed:
Although [the Truman Proclamation] was not the first or the only
[instrument] to have appeared, it has in the opinion of the Court a special
status. Previously, various theories as to the nature and extent of the rights
relative to or exercisable over the continental shelf had been advanced by
jurists, publicists and technicians. The Truman Proclamation however,
soon came to be regarded as the starting point of the positive law on the
subject, and the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely that of the coastal
State as having an original, natural, and exclusive (in short vested) right
to the continental shelf off its shores, came to prevail over all others,
being now reflected in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf With regard to the delimitation of lateral boundaries
26.

27.

Supra note 12. Article I provides that:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b)
to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Article 2 provides that:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article are exclusive in the sense
that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental
shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
[1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases].
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between the continental shelves of adjacent States, a matter which had
given rise to some consideration on the technical, but very little on the
juristic level, the Truman Proclamation stated that such boundaries "shall
be determined by the United Sates and the State concerned in accordance
with equitable principles". These two concepts, of delimitation by mutual
agreement and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles, have
underlain all the subsequent history of the subject. They were reflected
in various other State proclamations of the period, and after, and in the
later work on the subject.28
3. The nature of continentalshelf rights
The ICJ described the nature of continental shelf rights and discussed
the notion of "appurtenance" in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases.29
Sovereign rights over the continental shelf are an extension of the
sovereignty exercised over land domain. The continental shelf is a natural
prolongation of the land. domain into the sea. Thus, continental shelf
appertains to land.
The Supreme Court of Canada held in the Hibernia Reference Case
that continental shelf rights are not property in the ordinary sense, but
rather are "sovereign rights" which "appertain to the coastal State as an
extension of rights beyond where its ordinary sovereignty its exercised.
In pith and substance they are an extra-territorial manifestation of, and an
incident of the external sovereignty of a coastal State."30 Having regard
to the Convention on the ContinentalShelf, the Supreme Court of Canada
stated that a coastal State does not own a continental shelf and that the
rights thereto are something less than full sovereignty. The rights are
limited to the rights that international law affords the coastal State. The
Court observed that:
Continental shelf rights arise as an extension of the coastal State's
sovereignty, but it is an extension in the form of something less than full
sovereignty.... In the ordinary meaning of the term, the continental shelf
is not part of a coastal State's territory. The coastal State cannot "own"
the continental shelf as it can own its land territory. The regulation by
international law of the uses to which the continental shelf may be put
28. Ibid. at para. 47.
29. Ibid. at para. 39:
The a priori argument starts from the position described in paragraph 19 [of this Judgment],
according to which the right of the coast State to its continental shelf areas is based on
its sovereignty over the land domain, of which the shelf area is the natural prolongation
into and under the sea. From this notion of appurtenance is derived the view which, as
has already been indicated, the Court accepts, that the coast State's rights exist ipso facto
and ab initio without there being any question of having to make good a claim to the areas
concerned, or of any apportionment of the continental shelf between different States.
30. Supra note 13 at para. 18.
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is simply too extensive to consider the shelf to be part of the State's
territory. International law concedes dominion to the State in its land
territory, subject to certain definite restrictions. By contrast, in the
continental shelf the limited rights that international law accords are the
sum total of the coastal State's rights. 31
III. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law Of The Sea
1. The significance of the UNCLOS
Following a Second Conference held in 1960 that yielded no results, the
United Nations convened its Third Conference on the Law of the Sea in
New York in 1973. Nine years later, on 10 December 1982, the UNCLOS
was adopted and entered into force on 16 November 1994.
The Third Conference resulted from a need expressed by Arvid Parvo,
Malta's ambassador to the UN, for "an effective international regime
over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national
jurisdiction. 3 2 This need arose due to the ever-expanding uses of the oceans
for the charting of deep waters by nuclear submarines, the over-fishing
of the richest waters by large fleets, and the expansion of hydrocarbon
exploration deeper and deeper into the continental shelf:
In the late 1960's, oil exploration was moving further and further from
land, deeper and deeper into the bedrock of continental margins. From a
modest beginning in 1947 in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore oil production,
still less than a million tons in 1954, had grown to close to 400 million
tons. Oil drilling equipment was already going as far as 4,000 metres
below the ocean surface. Offshore oil was the centre of atfraction in the
North Sea. Britain, Denmark and Germany were in conflict as to how to
carve up the continental shelf with its rich oil resources.33

Canada is a signatory to the UNCLOS which it ratified on 6 November
2003.
One of the preamble clauses to the UNCLOS notes that "developments
since the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva
in 1958 and 1960 have accentuated the need for a new and generally
acceptable Convention on the law of the sea. '3 4 Another preamble clause
provides that it was a desire of the UNCLOSto develop principles embodied
in a General Assembly resolution "that the area of the seabed and ocean
floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as
31. Ibid.at para. 15.
32. "A Brief Introduction to the Legal Regime for the Oceans," International Institute for Sustainable
Development (16 July 2007), online: <http://www.iisd.ca/process/water intro.htm>.
33. UNCLOS HistoricalPerspective,supra note 2.
34. Supra note 1, Preamble.

352 The Dalhousie Law Journal

well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration
and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind
as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States."3 5
The UNCLOS represents a consolidation of pre-existing conventions
on the law of the sea, widely adopted practices that had not necessarily
become customary international law, and new concepts to address the
expanding technical capabilities of coastal States to explore and exploit
living and non-living resources on the continental shelf and in the deep
sea.
From the perspective of offshore oil and gas development, the key
provisions of the UNCLOS are:
* the establishment of a twelve-nautical-mile limit for the territorial
sea and a contiguous zone having a breadth of a further twelve
nautical miles;36
* the establishment of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone;
* the granting of limited sovereign rights over resource exploration
and exploitation on the continental shelf, including the portion of
the shelf that extends beyond the limits of the exclusive economic
zone;
* the creation of an international "tax" on production from the
continental shelf outside the limits of the exclusive economic zone;
* the establishment of rules for determining the boundaries of the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental
shelf;
* the establishment of clearly defined options and procedures for the
settlement of disputes;
" the protection of the marine environment; and
* with respect to the exclusive economic zone and the high seas, the
freedom of other states for navigation and overflight, as well as the
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.37
Although the United States was a party to the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, as well as the three other law of the sea conventions
35. Ibid.
36. While the Convention on the TerritorialSea and the Contiguous Zone explicitly established the
territorial sea it did not prescribe the limit of its breadth. By implication,. it would be no greater than
twelve nautical miles, as that was the limit prescribed for the contiguous zone, as established for the
first time by the Convention on the TerritorialSea and the Contiguous Zone.
37. Supra note I, Articles 58 and 87.
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made in 1958, it did not ratify the UNCLOS due to concerns within the
administration of President Ronald Reagan regarding the deep seabed
mining provisions under Part XI of the UNCLOS.3 8 Primarily the concerns
related to the function, authority, and governance of the International
Seabed Authority (ISA). It was the view of the United States that the ISA
regime failed to adequately recognize American political and economic
interests. Part XI created the ISA and granted it authority over mining
operations. Mining would be undertaken by a body of the ISA called the
Enterprise, coastal States would be required to fund the Enterprise, and
mining technology would have to be transferred to the Enterprise (albeit
under fair and reasonable terms and conditions). 39 Further, the ISA's
governance would enable amendments to be made to Part XI without the
40
consent of the United States.
In his 1983 Statement on United States Oceans Policy,41 President
Reagan announced that the United States would not sign the UNCLOS.
However, in effect, he also declared that the United States would act in
accordance with the Convention, except for Part XI.
American concerns resulted in negotiations commencing in 1990 under
the administration of President George H.W. Bush concerning changes to
Article XI. This led to the 1994 Agreement relatingto the implementation
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 (1994 Agreement), 4 which was signed by the United
States on 29 July 1994 under the administration of President Bill Clinton.
Ratification of the UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement requires a
minimum two-thirds approval by the United States Senate.43 On 7 October
1994 President Clinton referred the two treaties to the Senate Committee
4
on Foreign Relations, but they were not put to a vote in the Senate.
Polarized ideological debate has persisted in the United States as to
whether the 1994 Agreement has resolved the earlier concerns regarding the
function, authority, and governance of the ISA and whether the UNCLOS
38. Supra note 1,Articles 133-191.
39. U.S., Fact Sheet on Deep Seabed Mining and the InternationalSeabed Authority, 24 March
2004 letter from Senators Richard G. Lugar and Ted Stevens to members of the United States Senate.
Online: Richard G. Lugar United States Senator for Indiana <http://ugar.senate.gov/sfre/colleague.
html>.
40. Supra note 1, Article 155.
41. U.S., Presidential Statement, 10 March 1983, online: <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/
speeches/1983/3 1083c.htm>.
42. UN, A/RES/48/263, 17 August 1994..
43. U.S. Const., art. II, §2.
44. U.S., CRS Issue Brief For Congress, The U.N.Law of the Sea Convention and the UnitedStates:
Developments Since October 2003, by Majorie Ann Browne, 3 June 2005, online: <http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/row/RS21890.pdf>.
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is consistent with the economic, security and environmental interests of
the United States. In February 2004, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations voted in favour of the UNCLOS 5 and in March 2004 published
a report urging other members of the Senate to support it but a full Senate
vote was not taken.46 The administration of President George W. Bush has
concluded that there are important reasons for the United States to become
a party to the UNCLOS4 7 and in May 2007 a Presidential Statement was
issued urging the Senate to approve it. 48 On 31 October 2007, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee voted 17-4 to send the UNCLOS to the full
Senate for ratification.4 9,Such a vote has not yet occurred.
2. Territorialsea and contiguous zone
Part II of the UNCLOS ° lays down the principles governing the outer limit
of the territorial sea and its legal status, including that of its superjacent
air space and its bed and subsoil. The "sovereignty of a coastal State,
including an island, extends beyond its land territory and internal waters,
and in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an
adjacent belt of sea described as the territorial sea."'" Every coastal State.
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding twelve nautical miles measured from baselines determined in
accordance with UNCLOS."52 The normal baseline used for determining
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured from the low-water line along
the coast.53 However, straight baselines, for which appropriate points
along the coast are joined, may be used in "localities where the coastline
is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
54
coast in its immediate vicinity.

45. Ibid.
46. U.S., The United States Mission to the European Union, Bush Administration Urges Senate
ApprovalofSea Treaty, 24 March 2004, online: <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?lD-3515FDEBD68D-4E8C-B9A9-43D5EABE53DB>.
47. U.S., StatementofJohn F Turner,AssistantSecretary ofState, Bureau ofOceans andInternational
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, before the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, Washington, DC, 23 March 2004, online: <http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_
statements.cfmn?id=219509>.
48. U.S., Presidential Statement, Presidents Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the Worlds
Oceans, President George W. Bush, 15 May 2007, online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html>.
49. U.S., U.S. Leadership in the World and the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Clears Committee,
online: Richard G. Lugar United States Senator for Indiana <http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html>.
50. Supra note 1, Articles 3-16.
51. Ibid.,Article2.
52. Ibid., Article 3.
53. Ibid. Article 5.
54. Ibid., Article 7.
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Part II also establishes a zone contiguous to the territorial sea,
concerning which the coastal State may exercise necessary control to
"prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea" and "punish
infringement of such laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea."" In effect, the contiguous zone is a buffer area that permits coastal
States to reach outside of their territorial seas to protect against or punish
breaches of applicable laws within territorial waters. The contiguous zone
cannot exceed twenty-four nautical miles measured from the baselines
6
used to measure the territorial sea.
The internal waters of a coastal State are considered to be the waters
57
on the landward side of the territorial sea baseline.
3. Islands and archipelagicstates
Part VIII of the UNCLOS58 prescribes the principles regarding the maritime
areas to which an island is entitled. An island is a naturally formed area
of land, which is above water at high tide. An island's territorial sea,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf are to
be determined according to provisions of the UNCLOS applicable to other
land territory. Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
59
are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Part IV of the UNCLOS 60 establishes the rules for archipelagic States,
which are entitled to rights for a territorial sea, contiguous zone, economic
exclusive zone, and continental shelf.6' Baselines for determining the
breadth of the territorial sea and the other maritime zones may be drawn
using straight lines. 62 This Part also describes the sovereignty of an
archipelagic State in respect of the archipelagic waters enclosed within
its baselines and the air space over archipelagic waters. It also prescribes
rules regarding fishing rights, existing submarine cables, right of innocent
passage, and designation of sea lanes and aircraft routes.
4. Exclusive economic zone
Part V of the UNCLOS63 describes an exclusive economic zone and the
specific legal regime applicable to it. It does not exceed beyond 200
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Ibid., Article 33, para. 1.
Ibid., Article 33, para. 2
Ibid.,Article8.
Ibid.,Article 121.
Ibid.
Ibid., Articles 46-54.
Ibid., Article 48.
Ibid., Article 47.
Ibid., Articles 55-75.
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*nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines. 64 In its exclusive economic
zone, a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and exploit, conserve
and manage living and non-living natural resources, as well as sovereign
rights to the waters superjacent 5 to the seabed and on the seabed and
its subsoil 66 Further, a coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over the
establishment, construction, and use of artificial islands, installations, and
structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health,
safety, and immigration laws and regulations. 67 As well, a coastal State has
jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research and the protection
and preservation of the marine environment. 6t A coastal State is required
to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States when exercising
its rights and performing its duties within the exclusive economic zone. 69
Other States are required to have due regard to the rights and duties of the
coastal State and to comply with the laws and regulations adopted by it in
70
accordance with the UNCLOS.
5. ContinentalShelf
Part VI of the UNCLOS7" establishes the legal regime governing the
continental shelf. Within the area of its continental shelf, a coastal State has
exclusive sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources. 72 These exclusive rights are not contingent upon
occupation or any express proclamation by the coastal State. 73 Coastal
States have been given the exclusive right to authorize and regulate
drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes. 74 Article 60, pertaining
to artificial islands, installations, and structures within the exclusive
economic zone, applies mutatis mutandis to such facilities and structures
75
on the continental shelf.
The UNCLOS defines the continental shelf of a coastal State as
comprising the:

64. Ibid., Article 57.
65. The term "superjacent waters" refers to the mass of water above the seabed, often referred to as
the water column.
66. Supra note 1,Article 56, para. I(a).
67. Ibid., Article 56, para. l(b)(i), Article 60.
68. Ibid., Article 56, para. l(b)(ii) and (iii).
69. Ibid., Article 56, para.2.
70. Ibid., Article 58.
71. Ibid., Articles 76-85.
72. Ibid., Article 77, paras. "1-2.
73. Ibid., Article 77, para. 3.
74. Ibid.,Article81.
75. Ibid., Article 80.
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1. seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its

territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to
the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
-miles from the baselines from the which the breadths of the territorial
sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental shelf does not
extend up to that distance.
3. submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state, and
consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.
It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof. 76

The outer limits of the continental shelf on the seabed shall not exceed
either 350 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines or one hundred
nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which'is a line connecting
the depth of 2,500 metres. 7 Use of the 2,500 metre isobath criterion could
in some cases cause the outer limit to extend beyond 350 nautical miles.
Submarine ridges are restricted to an outer limit of 350 nautical miles
and not beyond. 78 Submarine elevations, such as plateaux, rises, caps,
banks and spurs of the continental shelf are not restricted solely to the
350-nautical-mile limit. 79 The UNCLOS does not define either "submarine
ridges" or "submarine elevations."
If a coastal State's continental shelf extends beyond the breadth of the
territorial sea, it is required to delineate the outer limits of the continental
shelf using straight lines not exceeding sixty nautical miles and connecting
six points defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude.80 The UNCLOS
prescribes certain technical rules for establishing the outer edge of the
continental margin.

81

If a coastal State wishes to establish the outer limits of its continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it is required to submit-to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf the particulars of the proposed
limits, along with supporting scientific and technical data within ten years
of the entry into force of the UNCLOS for that coastal State. In the case of
Canada, its submission must be filed by 6 November 2013. Annex II of the
UNCLOS describes the function of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. The Commission is required to make recommendations
to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ibid.,Article 76, paras. 1,3.
Ibid., Article 76, para. 5.
Ibid., Article 76, para. 6.
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Article 76, para. 7.
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of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal
State shall be on the basis of those recommendations and shall be final and
binding.82
So far, the following countries have made continental shelf submissions
to the Commission: Russia (2001), Brazil"(2004), Australia (2004), Ireland.
(2005), New Zealand (2006), Norway (2006), France (2007), Mexico
(2007), Barbados (2008), and Indonesia (2008). Joint submissions were
filed by the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, and Spain in 2006 and by
the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in 2008.
Canada initiated a mapping program in 2006 to identify the outer edge
of the continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic
zone limit on the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap.83
The mapping involves the collection of data for approximately 17,000
square kilometres of seabed offshore Newfoundland and Labrador. 4
Canada and Denmark initiated a joint mapping project of the
Lomonosov Ridge in 2006. Russia undertook research of the Ridge in 2007.
The Lomonosov Ridge is a mountain chain that runs approximately 1,500
kilometres across the Arctic Ocean between Canada's Ellesmere Island
and. islands off Siberia. The Ridge could be the subject of overlapping
claims amongst countries that have Arctic coastlines - Russia, the United
States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway. The maximum
breadth of an outer continental shelf claim for the Ridge would be 350
nautical miles if it is a submarine ridge or it could extend beyond that
distance if supported by the 2,500 metre isobath criterion and it is found to
be a submarine elevation.85 One commentator has suggested that Canada
could assert sovereignty over an area in the Arctic larger than Alberta,
with the potential for comparable quantities of hydrocarbons. 86 The area
of Canada's outer continental shelf in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans is
approximately 1,750,000 square kilometres. 7

82. Ibid., Article 76, para. 8; Annex II, Articles 6-7.
83. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, News Release, Canadas New Government Moves Forwardto
EstablishLimits of our Continental Shelf (20 July 2006), online: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/
newsrel/2006/hq-ac26_e.htm>.
84. Ibid.
85. Marc Benitah, "Russia's Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in UNCLOS"
American Society of International Law, ASIL Insight (November 2007), online: <http://www.asil.org/
insights/2007/l I/insights 071108.html> discusses the potential nature and extent of Russia's claim
involving the Lomonosov Ridge.
86. Michael Byers, "Canada joins with Denmark to map depths of the Arctic" Globe and Mail (23
March 2006), online: <http://www.cfis.ubc.ca/?artid=740>.
87. Supra note 83.
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6. International "tax "forproduction beyond 200 miles
The UNCLOS imposes an obligation upon coastal States to make payments
or contributions in kind for the exploitation of non-living resources from.
the continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit of the territorial
sea.88 Such payments are to be made on an annual basis to the International
Seabed Authority, in respect of all production at a site following the first
five years of production and calculated on the basis of one per cent of the
value or volume of production at the site. The rate will increase by one per
cent per year until the twelfth year and then remain at seven per cent per
year for each year following.89
The International Seabed Authority is required to distribute payments
or contributions to disadvantaged states that are party to the UNCLOS on
the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests
and needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the
land-locked.9 0
IV. Canada' assertion of continentalshelf rights
During the period following the adoption of the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf until Canada ratified the UNCLOS in November
2003, Canada enacted various legislation, undertook certain measures
and counter-measures and made certain executive orders in order to assert
jurisdiction in respect of the hydrocarbon and fishery resources in the
area of the continental shelf over which it claimed sovereign rights. Some
of the legislation and actions taken were in direct response to measures
taken by adjacent coastal States to assert authority within areas of the
continental shelf claimed by Canada.
In 1964, Canada enacted the TerritorialSea and FishingZones Act91
under which it established a territorial sea of three nautical miles plus
nine nautical miles for fishing. In 1966, in response to France having
issued hydrocarbon exploration permits in areas adjacent to St. Pierre and
Miquelon, Canada issued exploration permits adjacent to Newfoundland
and Nova Scotia that overlapped part of the area for which the St. Pierre
and Miquelon permits had been issued.
In 1970, Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct 2
in order to regulate navigation in an area generally extending one hundred
nautical miles seaward from Canada's Arctic shores in order to protect
88. Supra note 1,Article 82, para. 1.
89. Ibid., Article 82, para. 2.
90. Ibid., Article 82, para. 4.
91. S.C. 1964-65, c. 22.
92. R.S.C. 1970 (P"Supp.), c.2.
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Arctic waters against pollution. This was in direct response to the voyage
of the United States oil tanker SS Manhattan through the Northwest
Passage in 1969. Further, in 1970, Canada amended the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act 9 3 and increased Canada's claimed territorial sea
from three nautical miles to twelve. The amendment also provided cabinet
with the authority to establish fishing zones, which could extend beyond
the twelve-nautical-mile limit. Under that legislative authority, Canada
declared a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone adjacent to the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts effective 1 January 1977.
In 1982, Canada enacted the Canada Oil and Gas Act94 under which
it asserted jurisdiction over the continental shelf for a distance being
the greater of 200 nautical miles or to the outer edge of the continental
margin. 95 In the mid-i 980s, the Canadian government entered into accords
with Newfoundland 96 and Nova Scotia 97 regarding oil and gas resource
management and revenue sharing in the offshore regions of the two
provinces. The accords were implemented through mirror federal98 and
provincial legislation. The implementation legislation asserted regulatory
jurisdiction over the development of oil and gas within areas of the
continental shelf previously claimed by Canada.
Following the entry into force of the UNCLOS but prior to Canada's
ratification of the treaty, Canada enacted the OceansAct 9 in 1997, which
mirrored the maritime limits and corresponding rights and jurisdiction
prescribed by the UNCLOS. The Oceans Act created five maritime areas
consistent with the areas established by the UNCLOS and generally having
the same limits: (1) internal waters, which included all waters landward
of the territorial sea baselines;1°° (2) the territorial sea having a breadth of
twelve nautical miles seaward'' from the baselines; 10 2 (3) a contiguous
zone which extends a further twelve nautical miles from the limits of the
territorial sea;0 3 (4) an exclusive economic zone which extends from the

93. An Act to amend the TerritorialSea andFishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970 (11'Supp.), c. 45.
94. S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 81.
95. Ibid., s. 2(1), see the definition of "Canada Lands."
96. Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of
Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Petroleum Resource Management and Re venue Sharing,
dated 11February 1985, online: <http://www.cnlopb.nl.a/publicat/reg/aamou.pdf>.
97. Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord.
98. Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord Implementation Act, R.S.C. 1987, c. 3; Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord ImplementationAct, R.S.C. 1988, c. 28.
99. S.C. 1996, c. 31.
100. Ibid., s. 6.
101. Ibid, s.4.

102. Ibid., s. 6.
103. Ibid.,s. 10.
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limits of the territorial sea up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines;' °4
and (5) the continental shelf.0 5
The Oceans Act formally asserted Canadian jurisdiction over the
declared exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Canada. The
continental shelf was defined as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas, including those of the exclusive economic zone ... that extend

beyond the territorial sea of Canada throughout the natural prolongation
of the land area of Canada ... to the outer edge of the continental margin,
determined in the manner under international law that results in the
maximum extent of the continental shelf of Canada." ' 6 The Act granted
Canada "sovereign rights over the continental shelf ... for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting the mineral and other non-living resources of
the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf."'0 7
V. Canadas maritime boundarydisputes and resolutions
1. Maritime boundariesrequiringdelimitation
As noted previously, Canada has maritime boundaries with the United
States, France and Denmark. Canada's boundaries with the United States
are in the Beaufort Sea off the north coast of Alaska and Yukon, in the
Dixon Entrance between the southern tip of the Alaska panhandle and the
Queen Charlotte Islands, in the Strait of Juan de Fuca south of Vancouver
Island, and in the Gulf of Maine between the southern tip of Nova Scotia
and north of Cape Cod. The boundary with France is around France's
territorial islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, while the boundary with
Denmark is predominantly in the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay separating
Canada's eastern Arctic from Greenland.
In 1973, Canada delimited its continental shelf boundary with
Denmark concerning Greenland. Delimitation with the United States
concerning the Gulf of Maine occurred in 1984 and with France in respect
of St. Pierre and Miquelon in 1992.
Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic is becoming an increasingly
important subject due to issues surrounding the control of navigation
through the Northwest Passage, maintaining security for the North
American perimeter and the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Beaufort
Sea. Also, as noted above, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark
(Greenland), and Norway have Arctic Ocean coastlines that could lead

104. Ibid., ss. 13-14.
105. Ibid., ss. 17-18.

106. Ibid., s. 17(1).
107. Ibid., s. 18.
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to overlapping continental shelf claims concerning the Lomonosov Ridge
and possibly other regions of the Arctic Ocean.
2. Canada-Denmarktreaty regardingthe continentalshelf
In 1973, Canada and Denmark entered into a treaty that delimited the
boundary of the continental shelf between the Canadian eastern Arctic
islands and Greenland in the middle of Davis Strait; Baffin Bay and
northward to the Arctic Ocean.I 8 The purpose of the boundary delineation
was to permit each country to explore and exploit natural resources on
that part of its continental shelf. The boundary was established using
equidistant median lines from straight baselines along the coast of the
Canadian Arctic islands and of Greenland. 0 9 Along the most northerly
extent in the Nares Strait and Robeson Channel, the boundary was
negotiated on principles other than equidistance, likely with the concept
of equity predominating." 10
The countries have undertaken to cooperate and exchange all relevant
data and measurements necessary for more precise charting and mapping
and the parties have agreed that if new data indicates that the dividing line
requires adjustment, such adjustment will be carried out on the basis of the
same principles used in determining the dividing line.'
No boundary has been established between the two points located
on the north and south coasts of Hans Island, which is the subject of an
ongoing dispute between Canada and Denmark and each country claims
it as its sovereign territory. While the island is uninhabited and is only 1.3
square kilometres, it is considered to have strategic significance to Canada
in its efforts to exercise sovereignty over Canadian Arctic waters." 2 Failure
by Canada to assert authority over the island would likely be construed as
a weakness in its ability to undertake measures necessary to assert and
maintain sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage.
3. The Gulf of Maine dispute
The dispute considered in Case Concerning the Delimitation of the
MaritimeBoundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canadav. UnitedStates of

108. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom ofDenmarkand the Government of Canada
relating to the Delimitationof the Continental Shelf between Greenlandand Canada, 17 December
1973, (ratified 13 March 1974) [Canada-Denmark(Greenland) Treaty].
"109. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Limits in the Seas, No. 72
ContinentalShelf Boundary: Canada- Greenland,(4 August 1976) at 6.
110. Ibid.

11l. Supra note 108,Article4.
112. Canada, Library of Parliament, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty, PRB 05-61E, by Matthew
Camaghan and Allison Goody, 26 January 2006, at 5, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ information/
library/PRBpubs/prb0561-e.pdf>.
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America)"' involved overlapping claims by Canada and the United States
regarding the continental shelf and fisheries in the area of Georges Bank,
south of Nova Scotia and North of Cape Cod. The conflict was driven
by the abundance of fisheries resources and the potential for oil and gas
development on the continental shelf. The dispute first developed between
the countries in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf. This
arose as a result of both countries having issued geophysical exploration
permits in 1964. The issuance of these permits gave rise to a long line
of correspondence, assertions, denials, and refutals between the parties
regarding their respective and conflicting continental shelf claims during
14
1965 through to 1979.
Canada and the United States commenced formal negotiations on the
continental shelf boundary in July 1970 that ultimately ended without
resolution." 5 In 1977, both countries established a 200-nautical-mile
fishery zone off their respective shores."I6 This action enlarged the dispute
between the two countries concerning the continental shelf to include the
issue of the boundary delimitation for fishery resources in the superjacent
waters.
Pursuant to a treaty entered into between Canada and the United States
in 1979,"1 the parties agreed to refer the dispute to a special Chamber of
the ICJ for the delimitation of a single maritime boundary for both the
continental shelf and the fishery zones of the two countries. This process is
notable in that it was the first time that such a single boundary determination
had been submitted to an international tribunal. Also, it was the first time
that the special Chamber process for the ICJ had been utilized.
Canada and the United States transmitted the Delimitation Treaty to
the Registry of the ICJ in November 1981, and in January 1982 the Court
formed the special Chamber. Following the filing of memorials, countermemorials and replies, the Chamber convened an oral proceeding in April
and May 1984. Its decision was issued on 12 October 1984.
The Court held that there was no rule of international law or any
material -impossibility to prevent it from drawing a single maritime

113. [1984] I.C.J. Rep. 246 [Gulf of Maine Dispute].
114. Ibid. The extensive record of communications is described at paras. 63-75.
115. Ibid. at para. 65.
116. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331, (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882 (13 April 1976)); An Act to amend the TerritorialSea and
FisheriesZones Act, supra note 93.
117. Treaty between the Government of Canadaand the Government of the UnitedStates ofAmerica
to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area, 29 March 1979, 10204 T.IA.S. 6 [Delimitation Treaty].
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boundary as requested by the parties.' 18 As directed by the parties in the
Delimitation Treaty, the determination of the Chamber was confined to
establishing the boundary from Point A, shown on Map I, to a point inside
the triangle, also, shown on the map that enclosed the area within which the
delimitation line was to terminate. This was to avoid a sovereignty dispute
regarding Machias Seal Island and North Rock in the Bay of Fundy, or
having the Chamber prejudge the determination of the outer edge of the
continental margin, which was something to be dealt with by the countries
through negotiations in the first instance." 9 The boundary determined
by the Chamber is shown on Map I. In 1925, the parties had previously
delimited the territorial sea through the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay in
2
the Gulf of Maine part way into the Bay of Fundy. 0
4. The St. Pierreand Miquelon dispute
a. Delimitationof the Canada-Francemaritime areas aroundSt. Pierre
and Miquelon
The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are the territory of France. They
have a combined area of approximately 237 square kilometres and are
nearly ten nautical miles from the Burin Peninsula of Newfoundland. 2 '
The 1783 Treaty of Versailles 22 ceded St. Pierre and Miquelon from Great
Britain to France and granted French fishermen the right to fish in waters
adjacent to Canada.'23
Between 1966 and 1993, Canada and France became embroiled in
numerous disputes concerning the maritime boundary that would demarcate
hydrocarbon and fisheries resources within the area of the continental
shelf between their respective coasts. As a result of the Convention on
the Continental Shelf that recognized the sovereign and exclusive right of
coastal States, including islands, to explore and exploit the natural resources
over the continental shelf, France began issuing hydrocarbon exploration
permits in the area of the continental shelf adjacent to St. Pierre and
Miquelon in 1966. Similarly, in the same year, Canada issued exploration
permits in the offshore areas adjacent to Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
118.

Supra note 113 at para. 27.
119. Donald R. Rothwell, MaritimeBoundaries andResourceDevelopment: Optionsfor the Beaufort
Sea (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1988) at 9.
120. Ibid. at 3.
121. Court of Arbitrationfor the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France:
Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and Miquelon) (1992) 31
I.L.M. 1145 at para. 22 [St. PierreandMiquelon Dispute].
122. Definitive Treaty of Peace between France, GreatBritain and Spain, 3 September 1783, Article
VI.
123. Ibid., Article V.
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overlapping into the shelf area adjacent to St. Pierre and Miquelon. 124 In
1967, France and Canada agreed to a moratorium on exploration pending
a resolution on resource ownership.'25
In 1970, the boundary dispute spread to overlapping fishery zones
in the Burin Peninsula area. Canada extended its territorial sea from the
previous limit of three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles 126 and France
similarly extended its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles one year
later. In 1977, both Canada and France extended their respective fishery
27
jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. 1
Negotiations on the delimitation of the areas under national
jurisdiction of the two countries took place during 1978 and 1979, and
again meetings were held between 1981 and 1985. In 1989, Canada and
France executed an agreement that provided for the establishment of a
Court of Arbitration to carry out the delimitation of a single-line boundary
between the two countries of the maritime areas appertaining to France
and those appertaining to Canada. 28 In 1990, the parties filed memorials
and counter-memorials with the Court of Arbitration. Hearings took place
from 29 July to 23 August 1991 and the Court of Arbitration issued its
decision on 10 June 1992.
The Court of Arbitration awarded France a twelve-nautical-mile zone
and a further twelve nautical miles for the western sector of the islands and
a ten and one-half nautical mile corridor that extended 200 nautical miles
from the southern sector of St. Pierre and Miquelon.'29 This boundary is
illustrated on Map II. The corridor of France's exclusive economic zone,
often called the "baguette," is located entirely within the area of Canada's
exclusive economic zone and extends through the middle of the Laurentian
Subbasin, an area identified for potential oil and gas development and the
vast part of which is in Canadian jurisdiction. This is illustrated on Map
III.

124. Ted. L. McDorman, "The Search for Resolution of the Canada-France Ocean Dispute Adjacent
to St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1994) 17 Dal. L.J. 35 at 38-39.
125. Ibid. at 39.
126. An Act to amend the TerritorialSea andFisheriesZones Act, supra note 93.
127. See ibid.and accompanying text. Also see supra note 124 at 39.
128. Agreement Establishinga CourtofArbitrationfor the Purpose of Carryingout the Delimitation
of MaritimeAreas between Franceand Canada, 30 March 1989.
129. Supra note 124 at 58.
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b. France'potentialclaim for a portion of the continentalshelf
It has been suggested that St. Pierre and Miquelon be attributed a
"discontinuous juridical continental shelf."' 30 Such a share of the
continental shelf would in effect "leapfrog" from the St. Pierre and
Miquelon "baguette" over Canada's exclusive economic zone to an area
outside Canada's 200-nautical-mile limit.
According to Plentegenest, Iosipescu and Macnab the support for the
proposition is thatArticle 76 of the UNCLOS "does not address specifically
the issue of the disconnect between the outer continental shelf ... and the
Exclusive Economic Zone of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon."'' The Court of
Arbitration had been asked to consider France's claim to certain sovereign
rights beyond 200 nautical miles. However, the tribunal declined to do
so on the basis that such a determination was the responsibility of the
32
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.1
Plentegenest, Iosipescu and Macnab argue that "there appears to ,be
no applicable precedent in international law concerning the admissibility
of an extended continental shelf that is not directly connected to a given
coastal state's EEZ, or the exercise of sovereign rights therein."' 33 In
support of their proposition for a discontinuous juridical continental shelf,
the authors refer to the concept of "shared jurisdiction" and offer some
examples:
Where EEZs are concerned, there are instances where the concept
of shared jurisdiction has been given some credence in regions of
overlapping interest. For instance, in the Jan Mayen maritime boundary
case between Norway and Denmark, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) noted in 1993 that there was no reason in principle why separate
boundaries could not be defined for fishing zones that applied to the
water column, and for the continental shelf that applied to the seabed. In
essence, it would be possible for one state to hold fisheries jurisdiction
over a given area while another controlled the seabed. The ICJ made a
similar observation in 1984, in the Gulf of Maine case between Canada
and the USA. In actual state practice, there is at least one agreement where
a coastal state (Indonesia) has agreed to share jurisdiction over its EEZ
with another (Australia). It is not clear whether similar considerations
would apply to sovereign rights within extended continental shelves, but
in any case this question is beyond the scope of this paper.'
130. Marc Plentegenest, Michael losipescu & Ron Macnab, The French Islands of Saint-Pierreet
Miquelon: A Case for the Construction of a DiscontinuousJuridicalContinentalShelf (n.d.), online:
<http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.aulablos/ABLOSO3Folder/PAPER5-1 .PDF>.
131. Ibid. at 1.
132. St. Pierreand Miquelon Dispute,supra note 121 at para. 82.
133. Supra note 130 at 4.
134. Ibid.
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The above discussion does not identify any rule or principle of international
law on which France could rely to support a determination that it is
entitled to a portion of the outer continental shelf over which it could
exercise sovereign rights, similar to those contemplated by Article 76 of
the UNCLOS. The concept and examples of shared jurisdiction do not
seem to support a potential claim to the outer continental shelf. Sovereign
continental shelf rights are exclusive and therefore do not entail the
sharing of jurisdiction. Upon a boundary being delimited, there is a clear
demarcation where the exclusive jurisdiction of one coastal State ends and
the exclusivejurisdiction of an adjacent coastal State begins. Coastal States
may choose to enter into agreements to share jurisdiction for matters such
as the cooperative development of transboundary hydrocarbons; however,
they have no obligation to do so. Such arrangements would be predicated
upon both parties having sovereign rights, for which they can agree to
enter into a compromise. It would seem that in order for France to seek a
sharing of jurisdiction, it would have to first establish that it is entitled to
rights that could be shared.
5. Arctic-Beaufort Sea
There are two predominant and unresolved issues associated with
sovereignty in the Arctic. The first is the delimitation of the boundary
between Alaska and Canada in the Beaufort Sea for the purpose of
exploration and exploitation of potential hydrocarbon resources. North
of the Alaska panhandle, the land boundary between Alaska and Canada
is along the 141St meridian of longitude; the boundary does not extend
into the offshore area. The second involves jurisdiction and control over
navigation in the Northwest Passage, which will become increasingly
important if climate change results in the melting of Arctic ice and the
opening up of the Northwest Passage to increased shipping activity and for
longer durations during the year.
Concerning delimitation of the boundary in the Beaufort Sea, it
appears to be the position of Canada that the 141I t meridian land boundary
should be extended into the offshore area. In 1965, Canada began to issue
exploration permits in the Beaufort Sea up to and along the 14 1S meridian.
Further, Canada's one hundred-nautical-mile pollution prevention zone
established under the Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct'35 uses the
141st meridian as the western boundary. Similarly, the 141 s' meridian was
used by Canada as the western boundary to its 200-nautical-mile fishing
zone in the Arctic set pursuant to amendments to the TerritorialSea and
135. Supra note 92.
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FishingZones Act. 136 In 1976, the United States applied the principle of
equidistance to draw a line that was east of an extended 1411t meridian
boundary line. 137 However, as discussed below, the equidistance method
has been critiqued in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases for its potential
failure to achieve an equitable result in delimitation. As future oil and gas
development in the Beaufort Sea becomes warranted and encroaches upon
the areas of potential boundary dispute, Canada and the United States
will have an incentive to seek and obtain jurisdictional certainty through
delimitation.
Regarding jurisdiction and control of navigation through Canadian.
Arctic waters, tensions between Canada and the United States arose
following two voyages by the United States, oil tanker SS Manhattan
through the Northwest Passage in 1969 and 1970, followed by the voyage
of the US icebreaker CGS Polar Sea in 1985. As noted above, the 1969
voyage of the SS Manhattan caused the Canadian government to enact
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 138 to impose the one hundrednautical-mile pollution control zone in Arctic waters.
In 1985, Canada enclosed the waters of the Northwest Passage and
archipelago using straight baselines and has asserted a claim of internal
waters.'39 The United States rejected Canada's claim that Arctic waters
are internal waters of Canada stating that "acceptance would jeopardize
the freedom of navigation essential for United States naval activities
worldwide.' 14° The United States has asserted that the Passage constitutes
an international strait. 14 ' The European Union has also rejected Canada's
142
historic waters claim.
Increased and prolonged accessibility of navigation through the
Northwest Passage due to climate change would provide substantial
benefits for commercial shipping. The passage links Europe and the
Atlantic Ocean with Asia and the Pacific Ocean, and is 9,000 kilometres
shorter than transiting the Panama Canal and 17,000 kilometres shorter

136. An Act to amend the TerritorialSea and FishingZones Act, supranote 93.
137. David L. VanderZwaag & Cynthia Lamson, "Ocean Development and Management in the
Arctic: Issues in American and Canadian Relations" (1986) 39:4 Arctic 327 at 329, online: <bttp://
pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic39-4-327.pdf>.
138. Supra note 92.
139. Supra note 130 at 330.
140. Supra note 109 at 4.
141. Ibid.at3.
142. Ibid.
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than the Cape Hom route. 143 Conversely, increased accessibility through
the Passage could also increase the risk to the North American security
perimeter, a matter that would be of particular concern to the United
States. '44
6. West Coast of British Columbia
In 1972, the federal government imposed a moratorium on crude oil
tanker traffic through Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte
Sound due to environmental concerns. In the same year, the moratorium
was extended to include oil and gas activities. The government of British
Columbia imposed a similar moratorium. 145 Offshore exploration on
the West Coast commenced in 1958, with fourteen offshore wells being
drilled prior to the moratoria being imposed in 1972. It is estimated by
the Geological Survey of Canada that the Queen Charlotte Basin could
contain up to 734 billion cubic metres of natural gas and 1.56 billion cubic
metres of crude oil. 46 Two other basins have been identified on the West
Coast, the Tofino Basin and the Georgia Basin, both of which are south of
1 47
the Queen Charlotte Basin.
With the decline. in conventional supply of crude oil and natural
gas from the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, there is increasing
pressure to have the moratoria lifted. Environmental resistance to oil and
gas development in the West Coast offshore continues to be mounted. In
2004, the federal government established a Public Review Panel to conduct
public hearings to determine the views of British Columbians concerning
the lifting of the federal moratorium.1 48 The Panel was not charged with
making recommendations. Following the completion ofhearings, the Panel
reported that seventy five percent who participated opposed the lifting of
1 49
the moratorium, while twenty three percent were in favour.
Should the moratoria be lifted in the future, delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary between British Columbia and Alaska will be

143. James C.Kraska, ed. The Law ofthe Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage: The Conference
of Defence Associations Institute, Chapter 3, Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic (2007),
online: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/VimyPapers/Defence%20Requirements% 20for/o20Canada's%20
Arctic%20online%20ve.pdf>.
144. Supra note 112 at 5.
145. Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Report of the Public Review Panel on the Government
of Canada Moratorium on Offshore Oil and Gas Activities in the Queen Charlotte Region British
Columbia, (29 October 2004) at 1-2.
146. Evolving Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, (Canadian Centre for Energy Information, March 2004)
at 13, online: <http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/DUoffshore/Reports/Offshore FAMar2004_low.pdf>.
147. Ibid.at 14.
148. Supra note 145 at ii.
149. Ibid.
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required before oil and gas development could be allowed to proceed in
areas that may be subject to overlapping claims of jurisdiction. Similar to
the Beaufort Sea situation, it would be in the interest of both countries to
obtain jurisdictional certainty through delimitation as to the precise areas
over which they could regulate hydrocarbon development.
VI. Principlesandfactors that influence boundary delimitation
5 prescribes that
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental ShelfP
when delimiting a boundary, the principle of equidistance is to be applied
"unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances."
However, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,5 ' the ICJ found that
the equidistance method leads to inequitable results in certain geographic
circumstances:
The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by
the equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimitation
of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of concave or
convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is employed, then the
greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area is to
be delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great
an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical feature
must be remedied or 2compensated for as far as possible, being of itself
creative of inequity.1
The Court concluded that the equidistance method was not to be regarded
as a rule of law for the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. 53 The
Court went on to articulate that "international law ... permits resort to
various principles or methods, as may be appropriate, or a combination of
them, provided that, by the application of equitable principles, a reasonable
54
result is arrived at."'
Interestingly, the equidistance principle was not carried over into the
UNCLOS regarding delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. The UNCLOS merely directs that the delimitation "shall
be effected by agreement on the basis of international law ... in order to
achieve an equitable solution.""' Failing agreement, recourse may be had
to third party resolution under which the tribunal would be expected to
achieve an equitable solution.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Supra note 12.
Supra note 27.
Ibid. at para. 89.
Ibid. at para. 85.
Ibid. at para. 90.
Supra note 1, Articles 74, 83.
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In the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases,5 6 the ICJ discussed some of
the factors that must be taken into account in order to achieve an equitable
result in boundary delimitation-geological, geographic and the unity of
the deposits across potential boundaries. Another factor identified was
the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which an equitable
delimitation "ought to bring about between the extent of the continental
shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective
coastlines."' 57
In the Chamber's Judgment in the Gulf of Maine Dispute, it defined
what it characterized as a "more complete and... more precise reformulation
of the 'fundamental norm':
What general intemational law prescribes in every maritime delimitation
between neighbouring States could therefore be defined as follows:
(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such
delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement,
following negotiations in good faith and with the genuine intention of
achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party
possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by. the application of
equitable criteria and by the use of'practical methods capable of ensuring,

with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant
circumstances, an equitable result. 158
The Chamber observed that customary international law can only provide a
few basic legal principles that lay down guidelines and that "it cannot also
be expected to specify the equitable criteria to be applied or the practical,
often technical, methods to be used."' 15 9 The Chamber also noted that there
has been no codification of equitable criteria to be applied because criteria
have to be adaptable to the circumstances of each case. 160 In the end,
the equitable criteria and the practical methods applied by the Chamber
to delimit the single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine Dispute
were largely guided by political and coastal geography.' 6' The natural
separation of ecosystems, which can guide division of the water column

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Supra note 27.
Ibid. at paras. 97-98.
Supra note 113 at para. 112.
Ibid.at para. 81.
Ibid. at para. 157.
Ibid. at para. 195.
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for fisheries, could not be used because it was not adaptable to a division of
the continental shelf. Similarly, distinctive geological characteristics that
shelf would not be relevant
would influence a division of the continental
162
column.
water
to dividing the superjacent
VII. Dispute resolutionfor boundarydelimitation
The UNCLOS provides several options for the resolution of disputes
concerning delimitation of maritime boundaries. In particular, the
UNCLOS encourages and facilitates negotiated settlements among States
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention or in
respect of the forums and procedures for dispute resolution.
Delimitation of the territorial sea boundary between two opposite
or adjacent coastal States is to be determined using the principle of
equidistance such that neither State is to extend its territorial sea beyond an
equidistant median line measured from the baselines of each State unless
the States agree to the contrary. However, the equidistance principle will
not be applied when boundary delimitation 1is63 necessary due to reasons of
historic title or other special circumstances.
The delimitation of either the exclusive economic zone or the
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts is required
to be "effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution." 164 In a "spirit of understanding and
cooperation," negotiating parties are required to "make every reasonable
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and,
during [the] transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching
1' 65
of the final agreement.'
If delimitation cannot be agreed to within a reasonable time, the
166
parties are required to resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV
except if the parties have prescribed a process in a general, regional or
bilateral agreement, the provisions of which would apply unless the parties
16
otherwise agree. 1
Part XV168 establishes the options and procedures for the various
means of dispute resolution available under the UNCLOS related to its
interpretation or application. Articles 279 and 280 again emphasize one
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Ibid. at para. 193.
Supra note 1, Article 15.
Ibid. at para. 1 of Articles 74 (exclusive economic zone) and 83 (continental shelf).
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of the principle tenets of the UNCLOS-to encourage State Parties to settle
disputes by peaceful means of their own choice and at any stage in a
dispute or resolution process:
Article 279
Obligationto settle disputes by peaceful means

States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means in
accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United
Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means indicated in

Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.
Article 280
Settlement of disputes by any peaceful means chosen by the parties

Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at
any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation
or application of this convention by any peaceful means of their own
choice.
A State Party may invite the other party or parties to a dispute to submit
the dispute to conciliation in accordance with the Annex V, Section 1
169
procedure or another conciliation procedure.
Subject to the limitations and exceptions enumerated in Section 3 of
Part XV, Article 287 in Section 2170 prescribes four means of settlement
through third-party determination procedures: (1) the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI of the
UNCLOS, (2) the ICJ, (3) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII of the UNCLOS, or (4) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VIII of the UNCLOS concerning the interpretation
or application of the convention relating to (a) fisheries, (b) protection and
preservation of the marine environment, (c) marine scientific research, or
(d) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping.
At the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the UNCLOS, each
state is free to choose by written declaration one or more of these four
means for the settlement of disputes.7 1 In the event that a declaration
has not been made, the default means for settlement is arbitration in
accordance with Annex VII. 17 2 When the parties to a dispute have selected
the same procedure, the dispute can be submitted only to that procedure

169.
170.
171.
172.

Ibid., Article 284.
Ibid., Article 287, para. 1.
Ibid., Article 287, para. 1.
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unless the parties otherwise agree.'73 Further, if the parties to a dispute
have not accepted the same procedure, it can be submitted only to Annex
VII arbitration unless the parties agree to the contrary.'74
A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 2 of Part XV is
required to apply the UNCLOS and the other rules of international law
not incompatible with the Convention. However, this obligation does not
prejudice the power of the court or the tribunal to decide a ca se ex aequo
et bono,'75 if the parties to the dispute agree. 176 The decision of the court
or tribunal is binding upon the parties to the dispute and it has no binding
force except between -those parties and only in respect of the particular
77
dispute determined.
Section 3 of Part XV imposes limitations and exceptions to the
applicability of the compulsory procedures prescribed by Article 287 in
Section 2. In particular, Article 298 provides that a State may make a
written declaration' 78 that it does not accept any one or more of the four
means for settlement provided for in Section 2 with respect to certain
categories of disputes, including those related to boundary delimitations
involving Articles 15 (territorial sea), 74 (exclusive economic zone) and
83 (continental shelf).
Where such an Article 298 declaration has been made, and a dispute has
not been settled within a reasonable period of time, then upon the request
of one of the parties, the parties must accept submission of the dispute to
conciliation under Annex V, Section 2 of the UNCLOS. 179 Conciliation is
conducted by a five-member Conciliation Commission that determines its
own procedure, unless the parties otherwise agree. 180 The function of the
Commission is to hear the parties, examine their claims and objectives
and make proposals to the parties with a view to reaching an amicable
settlement.' 8' Within twelve months of its constitution, the Commission
is required to file its report, which would include, among other matters,
such recommendations as the Commission may deem appropriate for an
amicable settlement. The Commission's report is not binding upon the
parties. 8 2 Conciliation is terminated when a settlement has been obtained,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
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the parties have accepted or one party has rejected the Commission's
recommendations or three months has expired from the transmittal of the
report to the parties.I83
Following the presentation of the Commission's report, the parties are
required to negotiate an agreement. Such agreement will be negotiated on
the basis of the report. If the negotiations do not result in an agreement,
the parties may submit the question in dispute for determination under one
of the four means of dispute resolution provided for in Section 2, Article
287.'8 4
Canada and the coastal States with which it shares a maritime boundary,
except the United States, which is not a signatory to the UNCLOS, have
made declarations under Article 287 or 298.185 Until such time as the
United States ratifies the UNCLOS, any dispute involving the continental
shelf boundary between it and Canada could be determined by agreement
or third party resolution under the provisions of the 1958 Convention on
86
the .ContinentalShelf 1
VIII. Arrangementsfor transboundarydevelopment
Delimited boundaries for continental shelves will often necessitate and
therefore lead to cooperative arrangements between adjacent coastal
States for the development of hydrocarbon resources that extend across
a boundary. This enables coastal States to obtain their equitable share
of transboundary hydrocarbons, diminish the potential for disputes and
conflicts regarding potential inequitable drainage and lessen the risk of
causing waste of the resource. In the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases,
the ICJ discussed transboundary resources:
...it frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the line
dividing a continental shelf between two States, and since it is possible,
to exploit such a deposit from either side, a problem immediately arises
on account of the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or
other of the States concerned. To look no farther than the North Sea, the
practice of States shows how this problem has been dealt with, and all
that is needed is to refer to the undertakings entered into by the coastal
States of that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation
or the apportionment of the products extracted.'87

183. Ibid., Annex V, Section 1,Article 8.
184. Ibid., Article 298, para. I(a)(ii).
185. The declarations are listed online: <http://untreaty.un.orgENGLISH/bible/english internetbible/
partl/chapterXXl/treaty6.asp#Declarations>.
186. Supra note 12.
187. Supra note 27 at para. 97.
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The Court made reference to examples of cooperative arrangements for
transboundary resources, specifically the 10 March 1965 agreement between
the United Kingdom and Norway, the 6 October 1965 agreement between
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the 14 May 1962 agreement
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.
Cooperative development avoids the legal uncertainty under the
UNCLOS as to whether there is recourse in the event one country unfairly
drains the transboundary reserves attributable to an adjacent coastal State or
conducts operations in such a manner as to compromise the optimal recovery
of the resource. The UNCLOS does not prescribe resource conservation and
equity rules such as well spacing and well density requirements. Nor does
it provide potential remedies as available in some jurisdictions that can
ameliorate inequitable drainage or potential waste. Such remedies include
rateable take orders,8 8 common carrier declarations,8 9 common processor
declarations,' 90 compulsory pooling orders,' 9' and compulsory unitization
orders. 92 To the extent that remedies against drainage or waste might be
required for transboundary resources within adjacent exclusive economic
zones, support could possibly be found in Article 59 of the UNCLOS:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to
the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone,
and conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other
State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and
in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into'account the
respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as
to the intemational community as a whole.'93
Cooperative development agreements can be as simple as permitting each
country to produce its share of the allocated resources through facilities
located on their side of the boundary. Alternatively, the arrangements
can create more complex relationships through unitizations with an
188. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 0-6, s. 36.
189. Ibid., s. 48.
190. Ibid., s. 53.
191. Ibid., s. 80.
192. CanadaOil and Gas OperationsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-7, s. 38; Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic
Accord Implementation Act, supranote 98, s. 173; Canada-NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord ImplementationAct, supra note 98, s. 178.
193. Supra note 1.See also Article 142, which pertains to the "Area," being the seabed, ocean floor and
subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Although not explicitly applicable to transboundary
resources between adjacent coastal States, it prescribes a principle to which reference could be made
in any dispute regarding drainage or waste. It provides: "Activities in the Area, with respect to resource
deposits in the Area which lie across the limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due
regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction such deposits
lie."
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agreed-to regulatory structure or through joint developments under the
jurisdiction of the country on whose side of the boundary the development
occurs. Such a regulatory structure could involve the creation of a body
that exercises authority over the issuance of development permits and
approvals, the operational and environmental standards to be applied, the
monitoring of operations, and the enforcement of applicable standards and
requirements.
Depending upon the nature of the arrangement, cooperative
development of transboundary hydrocarbons can provide the opportunity
to efficiently utilize capital. This is so to the extent that duplication of
facilities can be avoided or economies of scale can be achieved. Also,
cooperative development could lessen overall environmental impacts, and
enable each party to obtain its fair share of production or revenues.
In the Canadian context, the potential for transboundary development
has been addressed for the delimited boundaries with Denmark (Greenland)
and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon). Article 5 of the Canada-Denmark
(Greenland)Treaty'9 4 provides that the parties shall seek to reach agreement
on the joint exploitation of transboundary petroleum structures or fields or
in respect of the part of a structure or field which is located on one side of
the dividing line but is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side.
In 2001, Natural Resources Canada, in consultation with the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, established a
plan to negotiate an agreement with France concerning the exploration
and exploitation of transboundary petroleum fields off St. Pierre and
Miquelon.'95 One stated objective was that such an agreement would ensure
that resource revenues are fairly and equitably allocated.1 6 The corridor
of the St. Pierre and Miquelon exclusive economic zone lies within the
Laurentian Subbasin, the vast part of which underlies the Canadian side of
the boundary. This is illustrated in Map III.
. On 17 May 2005, Canada and France executed a cooperative
development agreement, the "Agreement between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the French Republic related to the
Exploration and Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Fields."' 97

194. Supra note 108.
195. Canada, Natural Resources Canada, 2001-2002 Estimates, Part III - Report on Plans and
Priorities (2001) at 21-22, online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20012002/rNR e.pdf>.
196. Ibid. at 22.
197. Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, News Release No. 87, Canada and
France to Work Together in Atlantic Waters (17 May 2005), online: <http://w0l.intemational.gc.ca/
minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect-True&publicationid=382568&Language=E&docnumber=
87>.
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The text of the agreement has not been released and it has not yet entered
into'force.' 98
There is potential for the transboundary development issue to arise
with respect to the delimited boundary in the Gulf of Maine, including any
future seaward extension from the termination point imposed by Canada
and the United States upon the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Dispute.
The issue can also be expected to arise following future delimitation of
continental shelf boundaries for, the Beaufort Sea, the Dixon entrance if
the West Coast moratorium on development is lifted, and possibly the
Lomonosov Ridge.
A review of international precedents for bilateral arrangements
governing cooperative development of transboundary hydrocarbons would
exceed the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that there is a multitude
of precedent arrangements to help guide future cooperative development.
These include the agreements referred to above as well as the Timor Sea
between
Treaty between East Timor and Australia, 9 9 and the 2000 treaty
200
Mexico.
of
Gulf
the
involving
the United States and Mexico
Conclusion
Prior to the UNCLOS, certain aspects of the authority asserted by Canada
over maritime areas beyond the territorial sea had not been recognized
in international law either through treaty or customary international law.
The UNCLOS has established clear rules and principles and provided
jurisdictional certainty upon which coastal States may establish regulatory
structures for the development of hydrocarbon resources within their
continental shelves. 201 It has removed the jurisdictional uncertainty
concerning the existence of rights held by coastal States to regulate oil
and gas development on their continental shelves beyond the limit of
the territorial sea and even beyond the 200-nautical-mile economic or
resource zone claimed by many coastal States prior to the adoption of the
UNCLOS.

198. Government of Canada, Canada Treaty Information, online: <http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/
Details.asp?Treaty_Id= 105028>.
199. Timor Sea Treaty Between the Government of East 7imor and the Government of Australia,
[2003] ATS 13, 20 May 2002 (entered into force 2 April 2003).
200. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, 9 June 2000, S.Treaty DOC. No 106-39 (2000).
201. A reference to a coastal State's continental shelf means the seabed and subsoil within the
exclusive economic zone and any portion of the continental shelf that extends beyond, but not further
than 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, as the case may be. See
supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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The UNCLOShas established rules for the 200-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone. It has enlarged the potential breadth of a continental shelf
and expanded upon the rights and obligations first provided for in the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf These measures have clarified the
nature and extent to which jurisdiction may be exerted over the continental
shelf for the purpose of producing hydrocarbons.
Canada has the sovereign right to establish regulatory regimes for
its continental shelf respecting exploration, development, resource
management and conservation, and protection of health and the
environment. No other nations may explore or exploit hydrocarbons within
any area of Canada's undisputed continental shelf even if such rights were
not exercised by Canada.
Jurisdictional uncertainty associated with continental shelf boundary
disputes can be eliminated under the UNCLOS. It has codified a norm of
international law by directing that delimitation of boundaries should be
by way of agreement to achieve an equitable solution. Failing agreement,
the UNCLOS provides for well-defined dispute resolution mechanisms.
These provisions established a foundation upon which Canada can engage
in future boundary delimitation of the continental shelf in the Beaufort
Sea between Yukon and Alaska, the Dixon Entrance between the Queen
Charlotte Islands and the.Alaska Panhandle, the Lomonosov Ridge, and
the seaward extension of the boundary determined in the Gulf of Maine
Dispute.20 2 The results of such delimitations will enable Canada to apply
the relevant regulatory regime for hydrocarbon development in these
areas to the extent they have such potential and there is no moratorium on
development.
Although the UNCLOS is silent with respect to the development.of
transboundary hydrocarbon resources, there is a multitude of international
precedents for bilateral arrangements involving unitization, joint ventures
or individual developments using agreed-to resource allocations. These
arrangements can provide for development to be undertaken under the
regulatory regime of one of the coastal States, by both coastal States
under their respective regulatory regimes, or under a new regulatory
regime specifically established to govern activities and operations within
a prescribed joint development area.

202. Supra note 113.
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